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MULTILINGUAL TREATY INTERPRETATION 
AND THE CASE OF SALT II 
David A. Wirth* 
Introduction 
Since the Treaty of Versailles was drafted in Eng-
lish and French in 1919, multilingual agreements have 
been increasingly important in international affairs. 1 
One result of this phenomenon has oeen the awareness 
that this type of treaty can present some of the most 
interesting and most difficult problems of interpreta-
tion. Not surprisingly, the typical difficulty with 
multilingual treaties is a difference in meaning be-
tween or among the texts. Faced with a possible dis-
crepancy, an interpreter must assume the task of re-
solving two conflicting principles of construction, one 
of which asserts that the texts are of equal force and 
the other that each provision of a treaty has only one 
meaning. Although the general proo1em of treaty inter-
pretation is related to the problems of statutory con-
struction and contract interpretation, the complexities 
presented by authoritative texts in various languages 
have attracted international attention mainly in the 
context of the p1uri1ingua1 treaty.2 . 
*J.D. candidate, Yale Law School. The author would like to 
thank Professor Leon S. Lipson for suggesting the topic of this 
article and for advice in its preparation. 
1. See Hudson, Languages Used in Treaties~ 26 Am. J. Int'l L. 
368 (1932). See also V. Lisovskii, Mezhdunarodnoe pravo 98 (1970). 
2. Similar problems do, however, arise in domestic contexts. 
Switzerland, for example, has long been confronted with the prob-
lem of multiple authoritative texts in the interpretation of its 
statutes. Doctrine asserts that all the texts must be consulted. 
For example, the French and Italian versions of Article 1 of the 
Swiss Civil Code should be examined in ascertaining the correct 
meaning of the German text. See O. Germann, Prob1eme und Methoden 
der Rechtsfindung 58 (2d ed. 1967); M. GmUr, Die Anwendung des 
Rechts nach Art. 1 des schweizerischen Zivi1gesetzbuches 124 (1908). 
See also Reed, Problemes de la traduction juridique au Qu~bec~ 24 
Meta 95 (1970). 
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The Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive 
Arms (SALT II)3 between the United States and the Soviet 
Union is an instance of just such a difficulty. Presi-
dent Carter and Secretary Brezhnev signed the Treaty on 
June 18, 1979, but neither side has yet ratified it.~ 
In the United States, Senate approval of the Treaty has 
been a matter of considerable controversy.S Ninety-
eight agreed statements and common understandings 6 ela-
borate the Treaty's provisions and appear, as does the 
Treaty proper, in English and Russian texts of equal 
authenticity. The greatest discrepancy between the two 
texts is probably in the Common Understanding to Para-
3. Depft State Bu11., July, 1979, at 23; 37 Congo Q. Heekly 
Rep. 1228 (1979); 18 Inttl Legal Materials 1138 (1979). The Rus-
sian text of the Treaty may be found at Izvestiia, June 19, 1979, 
at 1, col. 1; Pravda, June 19, 1979, at 1, col. 1. A copy of the 
original Russian text of the Treaty, including the agreed state-
ments and common understandings, is on file with Yale Studi e sin 
World Public Order. 
4. Article XIX of the Treaty provides that it "shall be sub-
ject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional pro-
cedures of each Party. This Treaty shall enter into force on the 
day of the exchange of instruments of ratification' ••• 11 In the 
United States, ratification is accomplished "by and with the Advice 
and Consent of the Senate, • • • provided two thirds of the Sena-
tors present concur." U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. In the 
Soviet Union, "[t]he ¥residium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R • 
• • • ratifies and denounces international agreements." 
Konstitutsiia (Constitution) art. 121, para. 6 (U.S.S.R.). 
5. See generaZly Moynihan, Reflections: The SALT Process3 
New Yorker, Nov. 19, 1979, at 104; Newhouse, Reflections: The SALT 
Debate, New Yorker, Dec. 17, 1979, at 130. For a general discus-
sion of the negotiations leading up to the Treaty, see S. Talbott, 
Endgame (1979). 
6. According to one of the negotiators, 
The purpose of these agreed statements and common under-
standings • • • is to minimize the likelihood of misin-
terpretations or ambiguities once the treaty is in force. 
These agreed statements and common understandings record, 
and in some cases elaborate, the common interpretation of 
treaty provisions by both sides. We have made every 
effort to minimize the potential for differing interpre-
tations of the treaty provisions. The detail of the SALT 
II Treaty attests to this effort. 
The SALT II Treaty: Hearings before the Senate Corrun. on Foreign 
Relations3 Ft. 13 96th Cong., 1st Sessa 240 (1979)(statement of 
Ralph Earle II) [hereinafter cited as For. Rel. Corrun. Hearings]. 
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graph 8 of Article IV,7 which reads in English as fol-
lows: 
During the term of the Treaty, the Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics will not produce, 
test, or deploy ICBMs [intercontinental bal-
listic missiles] of the type designated by the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as the 
RS-14 and known to the United States of America 
as the SS-16, a light ICBM first flight-tested 
after 1970 and flight-tested only with a single 
reentry vehicle; this Common Understanding 
also means that the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics will not produce the third stage of 
that missile, the reentry vehicle of that 
missile, or the appropriate device for targeting 
the reentry vehicle of that missile. 8 
The Russian text is the following: 
6. (Continued) 
The agreed statements generally contain more significant obliga-
tions than the common understandings. Id.~ Pt. 6~ at 52 (statement 
of Ralph Earle II). Both have the same binding legal force as the 
rest of the Treaty. Military Implications of the Treaty on the 
Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and Protocol Thereto (SALT 
II) : Hearings before the Senate Comrn. on Ar.med Services ~ Pt. 2~ 
96th Cong., 1st Sess. 541-42 (1979) (statement of Cyrus R. Vance) 
[hereinafter cited as Ar.med Services Comrn. Hearings]. Cf. Article 
31(2) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.39/27 (1969), reprinted at note 126 infra (annexes and 
ancillary instruments to be considered in interpretation process) 
[hereinafter cited as Vienna Convention]. 
7. The limitations ~ontained in this common understanding 
were of particular importance to the United States, since, accord-
ing to Secretary of State Vance, U[t]he Soviet SS-16 long-range 
mobile missile would have presented us with particular verifica-
tion problems, because its first two stages cannot be distinguish-
ed from the intermediate range missile, the SS-20." For. Rel. 
Comrn. Hearings~ Ft. 1~ supra note 6, at 92 (statement of Cyrus R. 
Vance). Intermediate range missiles such as the SS-20 are not 
limited by SALT II, although they may be the subject of agreements 
currently being negotiated. See New' U.S.-Soviet Arms Talks Open 
in Geneva Under Strictest Secrecy~ N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1980, at 
AlO, col. 2 (cityed.). 
8. Dep't State Bull., supra note 3, at 30; 18 Int'l Legal 
Materials 1146: 37 Congo Q. Weekly Rep. 1232 (emphasis supplied). 
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B Te'tl:eHHe cpOKa geHcTBHH .f(oroBopa COiOS 
COBeTCKHX CO~anHCTH'tl:eCRHX Pecny6nHK He 6ygeT 
npOHSBOgHTb, HCIlblTbmaT·b u paSBepTbIBaTb MBP 
fMe7KK0HTHHeHT3IThHbJe 6aJIJIHCTHtreCKHe paKeTbI] THIIa. 
HMeHyeMOrO B COIDse COBeTCRHX CO~HanHCTH'tl:eCRHX 
Pecny6JlliK IPC-14" H H3BeCTHoro B Coe~fHeHHbIX 
illTaTax AMepHRH KaK ICC-16", - JIerKHe 
MBP, BnepBbIe npomeAIIlHe JIeTHble HCJIbITaHHH nOCJIe 
1970 roga H npomegmHe JIeTHble HCnbITaHHH TOJIbKO 
C MOH06JIo~OH rOJIOBHOH 'tl:aCTbW; HaCTo~ee o6ID,ee 
nOHHMaHHe OSHa'tl:aeT T~e, 'tl:TO COIDS COBeTCRHX 
CO~aJlliCTH'tl:eCKHX Pecny6nHK He 6ygeT npOHSBOgHTb 
TpeTbW cTyneHb 3TOH paKeTbI, rOJIOBHyro 'tl:aCTb 3TOH 
paKeTbIU COOTBeTCTByro~ee YCTpOHCTBO AJIH HaBeAeHHH 
rOJIOBHOH 'tl:aCTH 3TOH PaKeTbI.9 
[VOL. 6 
The Russian may be translated in the following manner: 
During the term of the Treaty, the Union of 
Soviet Socialist RepuBlics will not produce, 
test and deploy ICBMs of the type designated by 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as the 
RS-14 and known to the United States of America 
as the SS-16, a light ICBM first flight~tested 
after 1970 and flight-tested only with a single 
reentry vehicle; this Common Understanding 
also means that the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics will not produce the third stage of 
that missile, the reentry vehicle of that 
missile and the appropriate device for targeting 
the reentry vehicle of that missile. lO 
As is clear from this literal translation of the 
Russian, there is a divergence between the English and 
the Russian texts in the use of the word "and" in the 
Russian for the English "or." This occurs twice in the 
Common Understanding, in similar syntactic construc-
tions. Assuming the Treaty were in force,ll it is con-
9. Soglasovannye zaiavleniia i obshchie ponimaniia (original 
Russian text of agreed statements and common understandings to 
SALT II), supra note 3, at 16-17 (empnasis supplied). 
10. Id. (author's translation) (emphasis supplied). 
11. It appears that the U.S.S.R. has already acted contrary 
to the spirit and probably the letter of the Treaty. See Robinson, 
Soviet SALT VioZatwns Feared, Av. Week & Space Tech., Sept. 22, 
1980, at 14; Soviet Union Test Fires New MissiZe and Encodes In-
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ceivable that the Soviet Union could claim that the 
Common Understanding entitles it 1 for example, to test 
and to deploy tile SS-16 so long as the missile were 
not produced in the U.S.S.R.12 In other words, tile So~ 
viet Union could argue for a less extensive interpreta.". 
tion of the oBligations in tne Common Understanding 
than would be justified by the English text. 
This Article evaluates proposed solutions to the 
difficulties of multilingual treaty interpretation as 
applied to a concrete proBlem, the Common Understanding 
to Paragraph 8 of Article IV of SALT II. First, the 
precise meaning of the English and Russian texts is 
examined, with reference to scholarship from the fields 
of symBolic logic and linguistics. Then, after the 
texts have been clarified individually, various doc-
trines prescribing resolution of discrepancies--by 
choice of the text most favorable to the obligor, 
choice of the text in the language of the state to which 
a provision refers, choice of the least extensive text, 
choice of an interpretation whicn all texts have in com~ 
mon, and choice of the clearest text-~are applied to, 
and evaluated in the context of, this provision. 
I. The Neaning of the Texts 
To resolve the discrepancy between the two texts, 
it is instructive first to examine plausiBle alternative 
interpretations of each. Since the two occasions of di." 
vergence between the texts present similar syntactic 
11. (Continued) 
fo~ation Fpom It3 N.Y. Times, Feb. 16, 1980, at 4, col. 5. Recent 
evidence suggests that the U.S.S.R. may be engaging in precisely 
the activity which so concerned the American negotiators--disguis-
ing the long-range 8S-16 as the intermediate range SS-20. Wash~i1g­
ton ROUndUP3 Av. Week & Space Tech., Sept. 29, 1980, at 17. 
12~ This IDight occur if the U.S.S.R. imported the SS~16, in-
cluding all the parts IDentioned in the second clause of the Common 
Understanding, instead of producing it domestically. Such activity 
might still be a violation of either Article XII or Article XIII, or 
both, of the Treaty, which provide, respectively, that "each Party 
undertakes not to circumvent the provisions of this Treaty, through 
any other state or states" and that "[eJach Party undertakes not to 
assume any international obligations which would conflict with this 
Treaty." 
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difficulties,13 this Article will consider the possible 
differences between the meaning of the English phrase 
"will not produce, test, or deploy" and that of the 
Russian" He 6y,o;eT npOHSBo,o;HTh, HcnblTblBaT:b Ii pasBepTblBaTb"--
"will 1).ot produce, teS1: and deploy 2 \1 
A. The English Text 
A critical examination of the English text should 
consider the meaning of the word "or"--the question of 
inclusive versus exclusive disjunction. 14 Assume the 
propositions Below have the following symbolic repre-
sentations~ 
p = produces 
q = tests 
l' = deploys. 
The phrase ",,,ill not produce, test, or deployl' may be 
represented in the following manner: 
'V (pVqV1' ) , (El) 
where 'V represents negation and V represents the inclu-
sive disjunction. Expression (El) has the following 
truth taBle: 
P.. 
T 
T 
T 
T 
F 
F 
F 
F 
~ 
T 
T 
F 
F 
T 
T 
F 
F 
T 
F 
T 
F 
T 
F 
T 
F 
E vq: V!' 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
F 
'V (EVq:V1') 
F 
F 
F 
F 
F 
F 
F 
T 
13. Native speakers of Russian confirm this proposition as 
to the Russian text. 
14. A statement c0nsisting of inclusive disjunctions of two 
or more subsidiary propositions is true if and only if at least 
one of the subsidiary propositions is true. A statement consist-
ing of exclusive disjunctions of two or more subsidiary proposi-
tions' is' true if and only if one and only one of the suosidiary 
propositions' is true. I. Copi, Symbolic Logic 11-14 (3d ed. 1967).; 
w. Quine, Elementary Logic 15 (194l); H. Reichenbach, Elements of 
Symoolic Logic 23, 45-46 (1947). 
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The symbols UT" and "F" represent the truth or falsity, 
respectively~ of the proposition asserted at the top of 
the column in which the symbol appears. The truth 
values of the propositions p, q, and r are taken as 
given; the truth table is a device for evaluating the 
logical consequences of every combination of truth 
values for these premises. A uT" on a particular line 
in the final column indicates that, given the interpre-
tation of Uor" as an inclusive disjunction and that 
particular combination of truth values for the proposi-
tions, the Soviet Union has complied with the Common 
Understanding,. An "F" indicates a violation of the 
Common Understanding. The truth table shows that the 
U.S.S.R. is in compliance with expression (EI) if and 
only if it neither produces nor tests nor deploys. 
An alternative rendering of the English is the ex-
clusive disjunction, represented symbolically as 
'V (pAqA'lJ) , (EZ) 
where A indicat~s exclusive disjunction. IS Expression 
CEZ) has the following truth table: 
E. fL r pAqAr 'V (pAqAr) 
T T T F T 
T T F F T 
T F -T F T 
T F F T F 
F T T F T 
F T F T F 
F F T T F 
F F F F T 
The truth table shows that interpreting the English text 
as an exclusive disjunction implies that the Soviet 
Union complies with the Common Unders~anding if and only 
if it refrains fron engaging in exactly one of the acti-
vities of production, testing, and deployment. 
15. This is not entirely an accurate rendering, since dis-
junction is properly viewed as binary and associative. Reichenbach, 
supra note 14, at 45. For present purposes, however, this repre-
sentation will be considered to be true if and only if exactly one 
of p, q, and r is true. Note that expression (E2) carries the 
meaning 'V{ (pVqVr) & 'VI (P&Q)V(P&l1)V(q&r)V(p-&q&r}]). 
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It is important to put these two possibilities in 
perspective. Logical principles assure a consistent 
result once the meaning of the words has been deter-
mined, but the apparently simple conjunctions "and" and 
"or" can have multiple meanings, which can cause trouble 
in the process of reduction to standard logical forms. 16 
Unfortunately, there appear to be few general rules for 
distinguishing these meanings; the only approach is to 
examine the context of an ambiguous word or phrase. 17 
Even with such an elusive criterion, expression 
(EI) is the better, if not the only, interpretation of 
the English text of the Common Understanding. Most 
native speakers of English will interpret the word "or" 
in this context, a multiple disjunction of nonexclusive 
subsidiary propositions, in the inclusive sense. The 
inclusive sense seems to be favored except when the con-
joined propositions are, or appear to be, mutually ex-
clusive from the point of view of logic or experience. IS 
The propositions p, q, and P, however, can each be 
satisfied independently without encountering problems of 
logical exclusivity. In a multiple, as opposed to a 
binary, linkage the exclusive sense seems to be even 
more disfavored. 19 Moreover, the pattern of outcomes 
16. In addition to the problem of the exclusive and inclu-
sive meanings of "or," "and" may also be interpreted in both dis-
junctive senses. Likewise, "or" may sometimes have a conjunctive 
rather than a disjunctive meaning. Allen & Orechkoff, Toward a Mo~e 
Systematic Drafting and Interpreting of the Intema"l Revenue Code .. 
EXpenses, Losses and Bad Deots, 25 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 31 n.13 
(1957) • 
17. Id. at 40-41; Allen, SymboUc Logic: A Razo~-Edged Too"l 
for D~afting and InteX'p~eting Lega"l Documents, 66 Yale L. J. 833, 
844 (1957); Allen, Symbo"lic Logic and L~: A Rep"ly, 15 J. Legal 
Educ. 47, 48 (1962). 
18. See Allen & Orechkoff, supra note 16, at 31 n.13. 
19. See Quine, supra note 14, at 14-16; Reichenbach, 8up~a 
note 14, at 45. An example of a statement containing several 
subsidiary propositions in which "or" might be interpreted in the ex-
clusive sense is the following: "The coins in my hand are nickels, 
dimes, or pennies." The element of negation, as in the Connnon Un-
derstanding, may convert the interpretation from an exclusive sense 
in the positive assertion to the inclusive sense in the correspond-
ing negative: "The coins in my hand are not nickels, dimes, or 
pennies." 
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for the exclusive interpretation, as summarized in the 
truth table, has little to recommend it as a rational 
scheme.20 So long as the Soviet Union avoided engag-
ing in one and only one of the proscribed activities, 
it would be in compliance. Undertaking any two or all 
three would be permitted, whereas engaging in only one 
would be prohibited. Surely this cannot be the sense 
of the English words. 
Native speakers of English would probably interpret 
the Common Understanding as an individual negation of 
each act ion: 
'Vp&'Vq&'Vr" (E3) 
l'lhere & represents conjunction. 21 Expression (E3) has 
the follDl'ling truth table: 
P.. ~ r 'V12. &'V~ &'Vr 
T T T F 
T T F F 
T F T F 
T F F F 
F T T F 
F T F F 
F F T F 
F F F T 
The outcome for each combination of truth values for 
the premises is identical to that for expression (El) , 
and statements eEl) and (E3) are hence said to be logi-
cally equivalent. 22 In light of all these considera-
tions, then, the inclusive interpretation eEl) is decid~ 
edly superior to the exclusive interpretation (E2). 
20. This factor may of itself be significant in the inter-
pretation of a treaty. Cf. Article 32(b) of the Vienna Convention, 
reprinted at note 127 infra (reasonableness of outcome a factor in 
decision to resort to supplementary means of interpretation). 
21. A statement consisting of two or more subsidiary proposi-
tions linked by "&" will be true if and only if each of the subsi-
diary propositions is true. Quine, supra note 14, at 9; Reichen-
bach, supra note 14, at 27, 44. 
22, This is a consequence of De l-forgan t s Theorem, Copi, 
supra note 14, at 30. 
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B. The Russian Text 
The Russian text, in addition to ralslng the ques-
tion of the proper interpretation of the word "and, "2 3 
also involves the problem of the logical relation of the 
negation signified by "not"--II He" --to the rest of the 
predicate. 24 The systematic approach applied to expres-
sion (EI) above suggests the interpretation 
'" (p&q&1") (RI) 
for the Russian. Expression (RI) has the truth table 
P.. ~ 1" p&q&1" "'(p&~&1") 
T T T T F 
T T F F T 
T F T F T 
T F F F T 
F T T F T 
F T F F T 
F F T F T 
F F F F T 
which differs in outcome from the truth table for (EI), 
the preferred interpretation of the English,25 in every 
case except the first and last lines. If this interpre-
tation of the Russian is correct, then the Soviet Union 
violates the Common Understanding only by engaging in 
all three activities of production, testing, and deploy-
ment, The U.S.S.R. could undertake anyone or any two 
without violating the Common Understanding. The pre-
ferred interpretation of the English text, however, pro-
hibits each activity individually, with the result that 
the two texts are at least potentially inconsistent. 
Logicians and linguists agree that "and" in an 
appropriate context may carry a disjunctive meaning. 26 
23. See note 16 sup1"a. 
24. See gene1"aZZy Lakoff, Repa:r>tee~ 01" a RepZy to 'Negation~ 
Conjunction and Quantifie1"s~' 6 Foundations of Language 389 (1970); 
Partee, Negation~ Conjunction~ and Quantife1"s: Syntax vs. Semantics~ 
6 Foundations of Language 153 (1970). 
25. An interpretation of the English text as an exclusive dis-
junction must be discarded. See text accompanying notes 18-22 sup1"a, 
26, See note 16 sup1"a. 
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This proposition has found acceptance in judicial prac-
tice as well. For exanp1e, the Pernanent Court of Inter-
national Justice (P. C. L J.) supp1iec an in'clusiye disj unc-
tive meaning for the French word for "and"--"et"--on 
at least two occasions. 27 Courts in this country have 
also shown a willingness to substitute "or" for "and" 
and vice versa in an appropriate context. 28 This ap-
proach liou1d result in the interpretation 
(R2) 
It is also accepted that "not" in the present context 
may negate each verb individua11y:29 
(R3) 
27. Factory at Chorzow (Jurisdiction), [1927] P.C.I.J., 
sera A, No.9, at 21; Certain German Interests in Polish Upper 
Si1esia (Jurisdiction), [1925] P.C.I.J., sera A, No.6, at 14. In 
both cases, a dispute arose concerning the meaning of the word 
"and"--"et"--in Article 23, Paragraph 1 of the Geneva Convention 
of 1922, the relevant portion of which might read in English as 
follows: "Should differences of opinion resulting from the inter-
pretation and application of Articles 6 to 22 arise • • • they 
should be submitted to the decision of the Permanent Court of In-
ternational Justice." The Court in the German InteT'ests opinion 
concluded that "the word et • • • in both ordinary and legal lan-
guage, may, according to the circumstances, equally have an alter-
native or a cumulative meaning." Id. 
28. See~ e.g.~ United States v. Fisk, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 445, 
447 (1866) (" In the construction of statutes, it is the duty of the 
court to ascertain the clear intention of the legislature. In 
order to do this, courts are often compelled to construe 'OT" as 
meaning 'and, t and again 'and' as meaning 'OT'. '"); Homer Laughlin 
Eng'r Corp. v. J.W. Leavitt & Co., 116 ~a1. App. 197, 201, 2 P.2d 
511, 512 (1st Dist. 1931), quoted in Universal Sales Corp. v. Cali-
fornia Press Mfg. Co., 20 Cal. 2d 751, 775-76, 128 P.2d 665, 679 
(1942) ("IT]here is almost an [sial unanimity of holding to the ef-
fect that the terms 'and' and 'or' may be construed as interchange-
able when necessary to effect the apparent meaning of the parties.") 
Of course, this proposition can cut both ways in reconciling the 
English with the Russian later on. It may also have importance for 
unilateral interpretation of the Common Understanding on the Ameri-
can side. See note 40 infT'a. 
29. O. Jespersen, Negation in English and Other Languages 
115 (1917). Allen suggests that the distinction here is one of 
conjunction, (R3), as opposed to logical product, (Rl). Allen, 
Logia~ ~ and Dreams~ 52 L. Lib. J. 131, 139 (1959). 
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Expressions (R2) and (R3) are identical to expressions 
(El) and (E3) respectively and are like\'lise logically 
equivalent. 
Expression (Rl) appears to be the more accurate 
from the perspective of general principles of logical 
construction. ~iany native speakers of Russian, however, 
are likely to interpret the phrase in question in the 
sense represented by expression (R3).30 In support of 
the interpretation (Rl), however, it is important to 
note that a clearer and more idiomatic rendering results 
from the use of the particle "HH:" "He 6YAeT HH npoH3BoAHTb 
HH HCIlbITblBaTb HH pa3BepTblBaTb. "31 This is similar to the 
English "will neither produce, test, nor deploy," and, 
like its English equivalent, is some''lhat more emphatic 
than the official English text. 32 There are also other 
''lays of unambiguously rendering the sense of expression 
(R3) in Russian. 33 
The official Russian text, then, is left as the 
closest idiomatic verbal equivalent to expression (Rl).34 
Arguably, if (R3) had been intended, it could have been 
expressed, and less ambiguously, with "HH;" the fact 
that the only verbal construction l'lhich may possibly 
30. Letter from Charles E. Townsend (Dec. 8, 1979)(on file 
with Yale Studies.. in florZd Pub7i.c Order). Use of the word 
"or"--"HJlli"--to link alternatives suggested by a negation, as here, 
is rare in idiomatic Russian. Indeed, native speakers could not 
understand how English could logically use "or" in this sense. 
Perhaps as a result, a sentence such as ,~ do not have a dime, a 
nickel, and a penny" is considerably less ambiguous when translated 
literally into Russian using the word "and"--"H." According to 
native speakers, this construction is fairly common in spoken 
Russian. 
31. See G. Stilman, L. Stilman & W. Parkins, Introductory 
Russian Grammar 108 (2d ed. 1972); C. Townsend, Continuing with 
Russian 129 (1970). Native speakers say this rendering is "more 
Russian." 
32. Native speakers of Russian confirm this. See I. Pulkina 
& E. Zakhava-Nekrasova, Russian 543 (19677), Perhaps this is why 
this rendering was not adopted. 
33. For example, "He 5YAeT npoH3BoAHTb, He 5YAeT HcnblTbmaTb H 
He 5YAeT pa3BepTblBaTb" conveys the meaning of expression (R3) un-
ambiguously. This translates as "will not produce, will not test, 
and will not deploy." 
34. Native speakers confirmed this writer's suspicion that 
there is no simple way unambiguously and idiomatically to render 
(Rl), the partial denial. 
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render CRl) has a second meaning should not vitiate the 
intent of the parties, namely CRl). Numerous instances 
in the Treaty in which similar problems are unambiguous-
ly resolved provide support for this proposition. For 
instance, Article IX, Paragraph 1 includes the phrase 
"Ie]ach Party undertakes not to develop, test, or de-
ploy." The Russian text here is unamoiguous t "IK]~aH 1:1:3 
CTOPOH o6H3yeTCf[ He c03p;aBaT:b, He HCIIblTbIBaT:b H" He pa3BepTbIBaT:b." 3 5 
All factors in the interpretation of the English 
text point to only one reasonable result: the language 
of the English text prohibits the Soviet Union from en-
gaging in any of the enumerated activities. The Russian, 
however, is less clear. An interpretation which is 
theoretically plausiole and widely accepted among native 
speakers is logically equivalent to the English. A more 
formulaic approach, however, leads to an interpretation 
which has some arguments in its favor and would allow 
the Soviet Union to engage in anyone or two of the 
enumerated activities, so long as it did not engage in 
all three. 
In any event, the analysis proposed so far does 
not settle the question of interpretation. A logical 
and grammatical analysis helps clarify the potential im· 
portance of different interpretations of the individual 
texts. More specifically, such an approach reveals the 
possibility of a discrepancy between the two texts. 
Logical and grammatical analyses are limited, however, 
to the extent that they provide little basis for resolv~ 
ing a disparity once it has been identified. 
II. Reconciling the Texts 
Over time, widely discussed doctrines of inter~ 
pretation relevant to resolving the meaning of the 
Common Understanding have developed. The writing 
35. Perhaps this construction was rejected because it is 
more ;forceful. In particular, use of the verb "to undertakelt--
"065I3bIBaT:bCHII--may have oeen avoided oecause of its stronger 
connotations, especially in Russian, in which it contains a root 
carrying the meaning Itto bind. 1t C. Townsend, Russian Word Forma-
tion 38, 245 (1968); c. Wo1konsky & M. Po1toratzky, Handbook of 
Russian Roots 52-54 (1961). 
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of Soviet scholars, who often speak in a quasi-official 
capacity, is also important in predicting the theoreti-
cal and practical approach of the Soviet Union to this 
question. 36 Throughout this discussion, as concluded 
above, the English text will be taken to have a single 
meaning conveyed by the inclusive meaning of "or," as 
represented by expression (61). The Russian will be 
taken to have two possiBle interpretations, one of 
which, represented by expression QR3), is identical in 
meaning to the English. The other interpretation of the 
Russian text, represented by expression (Rl), which it 
is assumed the Soviet side lvould assert in any genuine 
dispute, allows the Soviets considerably more freedom 
of action. 
As a preliminary matter, it is important to empha-
size that there is little reason to think that this 
case would ever come before an international tribunal, 
such as the International Court of Justice (I.C.J.). 
Although the United States has submitted to the compul-
sory jurisdiction of the Court,37 the Soviet Union has 
not. The Soviet position is that compulsory jurisdic-
tion may lead to violations of the sovereignty of 
states.38 SALT II, not surprisingly, contains no 
clause providing for the submission of disputes to the 
Court. In theory and in practice, the Soviet Union is 
no more favorably disposed toward submitting to volun-
tary jurisdiction after concrete disputes have arisen. 39 
36. At least one source bas claimed that lI[t]he Russians do 
not, surprisingly, appear to have developed comprehensive and 
systematic theories about [treaty] interpretation. II M, McDougal, 
H. Lasswell & J. Miller, The Interpretation of Agreements and World 
Public Order 5-6 n.7 (1967Jlhereinafter cited as McDougal, et al.] 
See generaZZy J. Triska & R. Slusser, The Theory, Law, and Policy 
of Soviet Treaties 112-17 (1962); Esgain, The Position of the 
United States and the Soviet Union on Treaty Law and Treaty Nego-
tiations, 46 Mil. L. Rev. 31, 63-65 (1969). 
37. 61 Stat. 1218, T.I.A.S. No. 1598, 1 U.N.T.S. 9. 
38. [A]t international conferences when the question has 
arisen of the inclusion in a convention of clauses pro-
viding for the compulsory jurisdiction of the International 
Court, the Soviet Union has objected each time, and in 
necessary cases has made reservations to the compulsory 
jurisdiction, unacceptable to the U.S.S.R., of the Inter-
national Court. 
V. Shurshalov, Osnovnye voprosy teorii~ezhdunarodnogo dogovora 452 
(1959) • 
39. See~ e.g ... Lisovskii, supra note 1, at 110 (liThe right 
of interpretation belongs aoove all to the signatory parties,"}; 
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In the event of a dispute~ then, American officials 
are likely to be confronted with a unilateral interpre-
tation of the Treaty relying on Soviet sources. 40 None-
theless, it is important to consider standard legal 
theories developed by international tribunals, in view 
of their greater respect worldwide. 
Many writers recognize the existence of so-called 
canons of interpretation41--normative principles for 
resolving ambiguities--whi1e varying in acceptance of 
their usefulness as devices for treaty interpretation. 42 
There has been significant disagreement as to how these 
canons ought to be applied. 43 It is ","ell accepted, how-
ever, that certain rules of construction recur in the 
39. (Continued) 
1. Pereterskii, Tolkovanie mezhdunarodnykh dogovorov 50 (1959) ("In-
terpretation of the agreement with the consent of the states con-
cluding that agreement is undoubtedly the form of interpretation 
which possesses the greatest force and the greatest international 
effect."); Kozhevnikov, Mezhdunarodnyi dogovoY', in Mezhdunarodnoe 
pravo 242, 271 (F. Kozhevnikov ed. 1957), transZated as Interna-
tional. Treaties, in International Law 247, 217 (196l?) ("[I]n princi-
ple the interpretation of a treaty must lie within the competence 
of its signatories--that is, of those who apply it,") 
40. Indeed, interpretation of international agreements by 
the parties rather than by international adjudication is the more 
common phenomenon. McDougal, et al., supra note 36, at 28. 
41. E.g,~ L. Ehrlich, Interpretacja traktatow 241 (1957) 
(English summary); A. McNair, The Law of Treaties 365-66 (2d ed. 
1961). 
42. E.g.~ T. YU, The Interpretation of Treaties 72 (1927) 
("[R]ules of construction are unfortunately so abundant in the 
pages of publicists that a mere application of one, or a shrewd 
combination of two, of them may yield almost whatever conclusion 
the interpreter desires.") 
43. See~ e.g.~ M. Hudson, The Permanent Court of Interna-
tional Justice 1920-1942, at 643 (1943) (The P.C.1.J. "has formu-
lated no rigid rules; its formulations have been in such guarded 
form as to leave it open to the Court to refuse to apply them, and 
it would be difficult to say that all of them have been consistent-
ly applied.") But see Fitzmaurice, The La7.rJ and PT'ocecJure of the 
International. COUY't of Justice 1951-4: Treaty Interpretation and 
Other Treaty Points~ 33 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 203, 210-27 (1957)(sug-
gesting that there is a hierarchy in the I.C.J.~s application of 
the canons)Ihereinafter cited as Fitzmaurice II]; Fitzmaurice, The 
La7.rJ and Procedure of the International. COUY't of Justice: Treaty 
Interpretat~on and Certain Other Treaty Points~ 28 Brit. Y.B. Inttl 
L. 1, 9-22 (195l)(same}Ihereinafter cited as Fitzmaurice I]. 
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jurisprudence of the International Court. 44 Those 
likely to influence the outcome of a dispute over the 
Common Understanding, whether in the I.C.J. or not, are 
analyzed below. 
A. Fundamental Principles of Interpretation 
Jurists and publicists have formulated a number of 
general principles for interpreting the texts of inter-
national agreements. Two of these--the Rule of Ordinary 
Meaning and the Rule of Restrictive Interpretation--have 
particular significance for the process of resolving the 
meaning of the Common Understanding. 
1. The Rule of Ordinary Meaning 
One canon, the Rule of Ordinary Meaning, has been 
stated by the I.C.J. in the following manner: 
The Court considers it necessary to say that the 
first duty of a tribunal which is called upon to 
interpret and apply the provisions of a treaty, 
is to endeavour to give effect to them in their 
natural and ordinary meaning in the context in 
which they occur. If the relevant words in their 
natural and ordinary meaning make sense in their 
context, that is an end of the matter. If, on 
the other hand, the words in their natural and 
ordinary meaning are ambiguous or lead to an un-
reasonable result, then, and then only, must the 
Court, by resort to other methods of interpreta-
tion, seek to ascertain what the parties really 
did mean when they used these words. . . . When 
44. See" e.g." Harvard Research in IntePnational Law" Pt. 
III: Law of Treaties" 29 Am. J. Inttl L. 653, 942-43 (Supp. 1935} 
[hereinafter cited as Harvard Research]; Hogg, The IntePnational 
Court: Rules of Treaty Interppetation, 43 Minn. L. Rev. 369, 371 
(1959)(arguing that rules of construction increase certainty and 
acceptance of international law) [hereinafter cited as Hogg I]. 
The expression "International Court" will encompass both the Perma-
nent Court of International Justice (P.C.I.J.) and the Interna-
tional Court of Justice (I.C.J.), without distinction. 
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the Court can give effect to a provision of a 
treaty by giving to the words used in it their 
natural and ordinary meaning, it may not inter-
pret the words DY seeking to give them some 
other meaning.45 
The Rule of Ordinary Meaning seems to have found its 
greatest support in judicial decisions46 and in the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 47 It has 
445 
been criticized by publicists who consider it too rigid 
and claim that words cannot convey intention with per-
fect clarity.48 Still, some writers have found justi-
fication for this rule. 49 Whatever its defects, the 
Rule of Ordinary Meaning is clearly of primary impor~ 
tance in the jurisprudence of the International Court.50 
The rule obviously requires a choice of one inter-
pretation of the Russian text as the more natural. 
That choice, in turn, depends upon the credibility of the 
Soviet argument supporting a choice of expression (Rl). 
45. Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission 
of a State to the United Nations, I19501 I.C.J. 4, 8 [hereinafter 
cited as Second Membership opinion]. 
46. E.g., Constitution of the Maritime Safety Committee of 
the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization, [196Q] 
I.C.J. 150, 159-60 C'The words of Article 28(aJ must be read in 
their natural and ordinary meaning, in the sense which they would 
normally have in their context."); Polish Postal Service in Danzig, 
[1925] P.C.I.J., sere B", No. 11, at 39 ("It is a cardinal principle 
of interpretation that words must be interpreted in the ~ense which 
they would normally have in their context, unless such interpreta-
tion would lead to something unreasonable or absurd.") 
47. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/27 (1969), reprinted in 8 Int'l 
Legal Materials 679 (1969). See note 125 infra. 
48 •• E.g.~ H. Lauterpacht, The Development of International 
Law by the International Court 138-39 (2d ed. 1958);" YU, supra note 
42, at 55 (The rule is "based on the false premise that language 
can be perfectly identical ~vith human thought. It) 
49. E.g., Hogg I, supra note 44, at 404-06 (suggesting that 
the rule is more properly viewed as a presumption and that its 
application is beneficial as a check on arbitrary use of the judi-
cial power). 
50. See Fitzmaurice II, supra note 43, at 211-20; Fitzmaurice 
I, supra note 43, at 9-17. 
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If there is no divergence between the natural meanings 
of the Russian and the English texts, the question is 
settled at the threshold. An argument based on the 
Rule of Ordinary Meaning would then plainly be advan-
tageous to the American side. If, on the other hand, 
the Soviet interpretation, expression (Rl), were con-
ceded to be at least as likely as the conflicting inter-
pretation identical to the English, application of the 
rule would not of itself resolve the problem; the Rule 
of Ordinary Meaning offers no solution to the problem 
of equally authentic texts whose ordinary meanings are 
divergent. 
2. The Rule of Restrictive Interpretation 
The Rule of Restrictive Interpretation asserts 
that "if the wording of a treaty provision is not clear, 
in choosing between several admissible interpretations, 
the one w'hich involves the minimum of obligations to 
the Parties should be adopted."5l This rule is normally 
viewed as a ~resumption against limitations of state 
sovereignty. 52 Some publicists have attacked it as in-
consistent with the goal of interpreting agreements ac-
cording to the intention of the parties53 and ''lith 
another well accepted approach to interpretation, the 
Principle of Effectiveness, which asserts that a treaty 
should be interpreted to effect the ends it was intended 
to serve.54 The jurisprudence of the International 
Court suggests that the Rule of Restrictive Interpreta-
tion has not enjoyed the same acceptance as other canons, 
particularly the Rule of Ordinary Meaning. Regardless 
51. Article 3, Paragraph 2, of the Treaty of Lausanne,· 
[1925] P.C.I.J., ser. B, No. 12, at 25 (dictum). 
52. See~ e.g.~ Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District 
of Gex, [1932] P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 46, at 167 ("[I]n case of 
doubt a l,imitation of sovereignty must be construed restrictively. ") 
53. E.g.~ Lauterpacht, supra note 48, at 306 ("Undue ce-
gard for the sovereignty of one State implies undue disregard of 
the sovereignty of another.") See also Hogg, The International 
Court: Rules of Treaty Interpretation II~ 44 Minn. L. Rev. 5, 28 
(1959)("Whether ••• the rule [of restrictive interpretation] is 
of any substantial value in indicating a real intention of the 
parties is open to question.")[hereinafter cited as Hogg 111. 
54. See~ e.g.~ Lauterpa-cht 1 Restrictive Interpretation. 
and the Principle of Effectiveness in the I~terpretation of Treaties~ 
26 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 48, 67-68 (1949). 
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of whether the Court's claims that this rule is a means 
of last resort 55 are correct, it is clearly hierarchical-
ly inferior to the Rule of Ordinary Meaning. As a 
general proposition, the Rule of Restrictive Interpreta-
tion is probably insufficient to serve as the sole basis 
of decision in an actual case. 56 
An argument oased on the Rule of Restrictive In-
terpretation clearly favors the Soviet Union's position: 
it provides a doctrinal preference for the Soviets' 
narrower interpretation of the Common Understanding. 57 
The rule certainly favors the Soviet interpretation over 
the interpretation of the Russian which is identical to 
the English, but it is not obvious that a principle of 
restrictive interpretation provides a basis for prefer-
ring the Soviet interpretation of the Russian text over 
the unassailably clear English text. That is, the So-
viets agreed to the English, the English text embodies 
the intentions of the parties as well as the Russian, 
and the English is undeniaoly clear. 58 Indeed, properly 
viewed, neither text alone embodies the intention of the 
parties, but rather the two taken together embody the 
true agreement reached in the Common Understanding. 59 
55. E.g.~ Territorial Jurisdiction of the International 
Commission of the River Oder, [1929] P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 23, at 
26 ("[I]t will be only when, in spite of all pertinent considera-
tions, the intention of the Parties still remains doubtful, that 
that interpretation should De adopted which is most favourable to 
the freedom of States. "); Polish Postal Service in Danzig, [1925] 
P. C.!. J " ser. B, No. 11, at 39 (" [R] ules as to a strict or liberal 
construction of treaty stipulations can be applied only in cases 
where ordinary methods of interpretation have failed.") 
56. Hogg II, supra note 53, at 28; Lauterpacht, supra note 
54, at 61-62. 
57. To avoid confusion, the term "restrictive" as used here 
will imply a less extensive interpretation of the undertaking ex~ 
pressed in a treaty provision. Thus, the Soviet Union is assumed 
to be arguing for a more restrictive interpretation of the Common 
Understanding. The word "restrictive" might, alternatively, apply 
to the obligation itself rather than to the interpretation process, 
in which case the United States would be pressing the more restric-
tive view. 
58. See text accompanying notes 18-22 supra, 
59. Brazil, Some Reflections on the Vienna Convention on 
the LOl<J of Treaties~ 6 Fed. L'. Rev. 223, 238 (1975) ("[I]n law there 
is only one treaty--one common intention of the parties--even when 
the texts appear to diverge.") 
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Although the Rule of Restrictive Interpretation may pro-
vide grounds for preferring one interpretation of the 
Russian, it fails, as does the Rule of Ordinary Meaning, 
to resolve the conflict between the equally authorita~ 
tive English and Russian texts. 
Apart from this theoretical defect in an argument 
based upon the Rule of Restrictive Interpretation, it is 
unlikely that a court would resolve any dispute over the 
meaning of the Common Understanding by relying on this 
doctrine. First, if the discrepancy can be resolved in 
some other plausible way, a court might not reach the 
hierarchically disfavored principle of restrictive in-
terpretation. Second, the rule, understandably, appears 
to apply principally to general treaty provisions, where 
the intent of the parties when the agreement was con-
cluded may be difficult to ascertain. 60 The Common Un-
derstanding, however, is quite narrow in focus. Final-
ly, there are suggestions that, despite the lip service 
paid to the principle, it is in increasing disrepute. 61 
B. Specialized Doctrine for Multilingual Treaties 
The analysis so far has produced arguments which, 
apart from the disadvantage that they favor alternately 
one and the other side to the dispute, are logically in-
adequate. The problem is not that the policies ex-
pressed in those arguments are necessarily unacceptable, 
but that they are expressed in doctrinal language which 
is too coarse and general to be of use in the instant 
case. Perhaps as a consequence of the limitations of 
the Rules of Ordinary Meaning and Restrictive Interpre-
tation in dealing with multilingual treaties, particu-
larly those in which the texts are equally authoritative, 
refined doctrines, which purport to simplify the inter-
pretation process while providing greater analytical 
precision, have been developed. 
One such refined principle asserts the supremacy 
of the text favorable to tbe obligor. This principle has 
60. See, e.g.~ Hogg II, supra note 53, at 19, 26 n.79 (sug-
gesting that the Rule of Restrictive Interpretation is of importance 
primarily in interpreting provisions purporting to confer jurisdic-
tion on the International Court). But see Lauterpacht, supra note 
54, at 65-66. 
61. See Lauterpacht, supra note 48, at 305; Hogg II, supra 
note 53, at 19-28; Lauterpacht, supra note 54, at 62-63. 
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found scant respect among writeTs.62 Courts and other 
tribunals have been somewhat more willing to accept the 
doctrine, although only as a last resort. 63 Precedent 
in the jurisprudence of the International Court is 
slight. Probably the closest the Court came to accept-
ing the principle was in the Permanent Courtts advisory 
opinion on Competence of the Inte~nationaZ Labou~ 
O~ganisation with Respect to Ag~icuZtu~aZ Labou~.64 The 
question in that case was whether the competence of the 
International Labor Organization extended to agriculture 
under the terms of Part AlII of the Treaty of Versailles. 
In particular, the words "industry" and "industrial," 
which were accepted to include agriculture within their 
meanings, appeared in the English text. The French 
government argued that the terms Itindust~ien and 
"indust~ieZ," which the Court agreed would normally 
refer to the arts or manufactures, had been used in this 
restricted sense in the French text and that the Court 
should so construe them. The Court did not dispute the 
validity of the proposition asserted by the French 
government, but decided that the context was the final 
test and that, in this case, the meaning asserted by the 
French was inappropriate. 65 
An argument based on this presumption in favor of 
lesser obligation clearly favors the Soviet position. 
It overcomes the theoretical disadvantage of a Soviet 
argument based solely on tile Rule of Restrictive Inter-
pretation by providing a basis for choosing the Soviet 
interpretation of the Russian text, expression (R1), 
over the English. As demonstrated by the outcome in the 
Competence of the I.L.O. opinion, however, a court will 
not normally turn to this doctrine except as a last re-
sort. An American argument based on sounder precedent 
would, as a consequence, very likely prevail over a So-
viet argument based on this principle. 
From a theoretical point of view, this princip1e,of 
least obligation is unpalatable. It is clearly based on 
62. E.g., McDougal, et a1., sup~a note 36, at 329-30. See 
aZso Hardy, The Interp~etation of PZ~UnguaZ T~eaties by Inte~7 
tionaZ Co~ts and T~ibunaZs~ 37 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 72, 114-15 
(1961) • 
63. 
64. 
65. 
Hardy, sup~a note 62, at 114. 
11922] P.C.I.J., sere B, No.2. 
Id. at 23-27, 33-41. 
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the same policies as the Rule of Restrictive Interpreta-
tion and suffers the same disadvantage: its rigid ap-
plication would, in many cases, fail to give effect to 
the true intention of the parties. Although the doc-
trine is not expressly condemned in the Permanent 
Court's advisory opinion on the Competence of the ItL,O.~ 
the outcome suggests that mechanical acceptance of the 
doctrine is undesirable. This refinement of the Rule of 
Restrictive Interpretation undermines the notion of a 
multiplicity of equally authentic texts, as must any 
rule which conclusively prescribes the choice of one 
text over another. A text disregarded by such a princi-
ple is just as much an expression of the intention of 
the parties as the one selected. 
A second refined approach is to give supremacy to 
the text drawn up in the language of the state to which 
the provision refers or to the text in a state's own 
language. Some publicists may accept this principle,66 
but the majority reject it. 67 As with the doctrine of 
choice of the least burdensome text, precedent in the 
International Court is slight. The best support can 
probably be found in the case of Mavrommatis PaZestine 
Concessions~68 in which the Permanent Court suggested 
that the choice of the English version of the Palestine 
Mandate was "indicated with especial force because the 
question concerns an instrument laying dOlffi the obliga-
tions of Great Britain in her capacity as Mandatory for 
Palestine ."69 As will be seen presently, this authority 
is weak because the decision in the case ultimately 
rested on another principle. 
Application of this doctrine would, again, favor 
the Soviet position. Such an argument, however, would 
rest on rather thin authority and could be effectively 
refuted by an opposing argument with a firmer doctrinal 
foundation. From the Soviet point of view, this argu-
ment would have the disadvantage that it evinces a pre-
ference for the Russian text in general, but not for 
the Soviet interpretation in particular. This principle 
might, however, produce such a result if combined with 
other doctrines favorable to the U.S.S.R. 's position. 
66. E.g.~ 1 L. Oppenheim, International Law 862 (7th ed. 
Lauterpacht 1948). 
67. E.g.~ McDougal, et al., supra note 36, at 326. See aZso 
Harvard Research~ supra note 44, at 971. 
68. [1924] P.C.I.J., ser. A, No.2. 
69. Id. at 19. 
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This doctrine, that the language of the party to 
which a provision refers is controlling, is an even 
more arbitrary application of the Rule of Restrictive 
Interpretation than is the principle of the supremacy 
of the text favorable to the obligor. The reasoning 
here appears to res~ on the erroneous assumption that a 
party has a grea~er interest in the accuracy of the 
text drawn in its own tongue than in a text drawn in 
another language. In its more extreme form, that a 
party is bound only by the ~ext in its own language, 
this principle is a total abrogation of the doctrine 
that the intention of the parties is expressed in all 
the texts taken as a who1e. 70 This implies that, in 
case of a discrepancy, a treaty has different meanings 
for the various parties. It has even been suggested 
that a party may not avail itself to its benefit of a 
text in the language of another party. 71 Even those 
who would generally espouse the Rule of Restrictive In-
terpretation would have to admit this principle to be an 
irrational extension of that rule. 
A third proposed principle of interpretation for 
multilingual treaties is the supremacy of the more res-
trictive text. 72 This principle has received much atten-
tion as a result of the opinion in the M~vrommatis PaZes-
tine Conoessions case. 73 The disputed terms were "public 
control" in the English and "oontroZe pubZio" in the 
French text of Article 11 of the Palestine Mandate. The 
English was taken to be the more restrictive in meaning, 
limited to direct public administration of private enter-
prises rather than extending to all types of public regu-
lation, as implied in the French. The Court said that 
where two versions possessing equal authority 
exist one of which appears to have a wider 
bearing than the other, [the Court] is bound 
to adopt the more limited interpretation which 
can be made to harmonise with both ver-sions and 
w'hich, as far as it goes, is doubtless in 
accordance with the common intention of the 
Parties. 74 
Nonetheless, the P.C.I.J. accepted the proposition that 
the English could have more than one interpretation and, 
70. See note 59 supra. 
71. 1 Oppenheim, supra note 66, at 862. 
72. See note 57 supra. 
73. [1924] P.C.I.J., ser. A, No.2. 
74. Id. at 19. 
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in contrast to the rule it had just stated, gave pre-
ference to the wider meaning of the English in order 
not to nullify the French.75 The case has been criti-
cized by those who disapprove in general of.orderly ap-
plication of canons,76 and in particular because the 
statement of the principle was largely unnecessary. 77 
Applied to the language of the Common Understand~ 
ing, this argument, too, would favor the Soviet posi-
tion. The restrictive Soviet interpretation (RI) is 
analogous to the more limited of the two interpreta-
tions of the English text in Mavrommatis and is favored 
by the rule so plainly laid down in that case. In ad-
dition, this is a much stronger precedent than any of 
those examined so far. Indeed, Mavrommatis is probably 
the clearest and most detailed authority in the juris-
prudence of the International Court for the interpreta-
tion of the Common Understanding. Despite the Court's 
clear statement of the principle favoring the more 
limited text, the doctrine is seriously undercut by the 
outcome of the case, which suggests that an alternative 
interpretation of one text which is in harmony with the 
meaning of other texts will be given effect over 
another alternative, even if the second alternative is 
more limited in meaning. In fact, in a dispute over 
the interpretation of the Common Understanding, the 
American side could rely on Mavrommatis just as profit-
ably as could the Soviets. 
This third principle is a somewhat more felicitous 
reformulation of the Rule of Restrictive Interpretation 
than are the previous two. The P.C.I.J. 's formulation 
of the restrictive text doctrine has the virtue of pre-
supposing that all texts are to be given effect, at 
least to some extent. Despite the fact that the out-
come may be the same as under regimes asserting either 
the supremacy of the text favorable to the obligor or 
the primacy of the text in the language of the state to 
which the disputed provision applies, here there is at 
least an a~tempt to reconcile the texts, implying grea-
ter acceptance of the proposition that no single text 
embodies the intention of the parties. This third prin-
ciple also has the advantage of being a more general and 
hence more broadly applicable statement than either of 
the other refined principles so far encountered. The 
75. Id. at 18-20. 
76. See~ e.g.~ McDougal, et al., supra note 36, at 329. 
77. Hardy, supra note 62, at 80-81. 
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principle has the drawback, however, of glvlng imper-
fect effect to the intention of the parties through a 
prescriptive choice of one text over another. Such a 
principle, although an improvement over those articu-
lated in the other two doctrines, cannot truly recon-
cile the texts. 
453 
A fourth refined principle asserts that when each 
of the texts admits of several interpretations, an ap-
propriate resolution is to give effect to each by adop-
ting a single interpretation common to all. Although 
several arbitral decisions have given effect to this 
doctrine,78 support in the International Court appears 
scant. The outcome in Mavrommatis~ giving effect to 
the one of several interpretations of the English text 
most nearly consonant with the French, might provide 
some support. Still, that opinion offers little indi-
cation of the true basis for decision and no unambigu-
ous support for the proposition that discrepan~ies can 
best be resolved by selecting some common ground among 
the texts. 
Applied to the Common Understanding, this doctrine 
of common meaning would prescribe a choice of the Eng-
lish text, which has only one meaning, 79 over the So-
viet interpretation of the Russian. The principle 
would favor the United States' position regardless of 
the "true" interpretation of the Russian text. So long 
as one plausible interpretation of the Russian were 
identical in meaning to the English, the sole interpre-
tation of the English would prevail. Finding prece-
dent of sufficient force, however, would remain a prob-
lem for the American side. 
This principle of common meaning is the first of 
the more refined principles of interpretation for multi-
1inguals to begin to give effect to the policies behind 
the Rule of Ordinary Meaning at the expense of those re-
flected in the Rule of Restrictive Interpretation. The 
principle is theoretically appealing in that it appears 
to evince respect for the concept of multiple authentic 
texts, at least to the extent that there is some inter-
pretation common to all. Even the elements it shares 
with the Rule of Restrictive In'terpretation appear in 
a more benign form than in the three refined principles 
previously examined. If there is no single interpreta-
78. See cases collected at id. at 82-87. 
79. See te~t accompanying notes 18-22 supra. 
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tion common to all the texts, however, the doctrine 
offers no resolution and consequently fails as a general 
principle. 
At least one writer has asserted that a conse-
quence of this principle of common meaning is that "if 
one of the texts lends itself to several interpreta-
tions whereas the other permits only one of them, the 
latter must prevail. ,,80 Even if there is a common in-
terpretation, this formulation has all the disadvan-
tages of arbitrariness and lack of respect for the con-
cept of a multiplicity of authentic texts encountered 
before. Indeed, it subverts the general principle of 
which it is a specific statement, since the text with a 
single meaning may be less extensive than any of the 
mUltiple interpretations of the corresponding text. In 
such a case, no matter what the meaning of the text sus-
ceptible of multiple interpretations, it wil] not be 
given effect by this principle. 
A fifth and last of these more refined approaches 
to multilingual treaty interpretation prescribes a 
choice of the clearest of the several texts. Although 
other tribunals have accepted its validity,8l this prin-
ciple appears to have only the slightest support in the 
jurisprudence of the International Court. In its ad-
visory opinion on Treatment of Potish Nationats and 
Other Persons of Potish Origin or Speech in the Danzig 
Territory~82 the P.C.I.J. interpreted a passage from 
Article 104 of the Treaty of Versailles, in which the 
Allied Powers undertook to negotiate a treaty specify-
ing standards for the treatment of Poles in the Free 
City of Danzig, and reinforced its position with the as-
sertion that "[t]his appears more clearly from the 
French text of the article.,,83 Writers, however, have 
not supported the principle stated in this strong form. 84 
Needless to say, interpreting the Common Under-
standing according to the principle of the clearest text 
w'ould favor the United States' position. Such an ap-
proach could be particularly persuasive if invoked to 
suggest that the English should be consulted to clarify 
80. 
8l. 
at 327-28; 
82. 
83. 
84. 
Hardy, sup~a note 62, at 83. 
See cases collected at McDougal, et al., supra note 36, 
Hardy, supra note 62, at 87-90. 
[1932] P.C.I.J., sere A/B, No. 44. 
Id. at 26. 
McDougal, et al., supra note 36, at 329 n.179. 
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the Russian rather than to prescribe a conclusive 
choice of the English over the Russian. In other 
words, the English text might be offered as an aid for 
clarifying the intention of the parties as expressed in 
the Russian. 
This fifth principle ~s obviously more closely re-
lated to the Rule of Ordinary Meaning than to the Rule 
of Restrictive Interpretation. In its strong form, the 
principle shares with the refined approaches encounter-
ed above the defects of arbitrariness and lack of 
respect for at least one of the authentic texts.8S There 
are indications, however, that the principle often ap-
pears in a more benign form, prescribing comparison of 
the less clear texts with the clearer for aid in inter-
preting the intention of the parties as expressed in 
the less c1ear. 86 In this form, it deprives no single 
85. See Hardy, supx>a note 62, at 88 ("[W]hen the judge opts 
for the clearest and most precise [text] he is, in fact, giving 
effect to that version alone.") 
86. Hardy, supx>a note 62, at 88-90. A particularly inter-
esting application of this principle in its more flexible form 
appeared in the case of Archdukes of the Habsburg-Lorraine House 
v. Polish State Treasury,S Ann. Dig. 365 (Polish Sup. Ct. 1930). 
The case involved Article 208 of the Treaty of Saint-Germain, 
which was drafted in French, English, and Italian, with the stipu-
lation that the French text should prevail in case of divergence. 
Poland ~l7as to acquire "Zes biens px>iv~s de Z 'ancienne faratZl.e 
souvex>aine d'AutX'iche-Hongx>ie~ II or, in the English. text, "the pri-
vate property of members of the former Royal Family of Austria-
Hungary." Id. at 366. Members of the former royal family claimed 
that the French text did not apply to properties they held in 
their capacity as private individuals, and that, as it diverged 
from the English, it was bound to prevail. The court rejected the 
argument, stating that all three texts were authentic unless there 
was a divergence, and found no discrepancy after examining the 
English to help clarify the French. Since the English text was an 
expression of the intention of the parties, a contrary result, 
said the court, would improperly deprive the English of force alto-
gether, "[f]or no interpretation must lead to a change of the ex-
press and indubitable will of the contracting parties." Id. at 369. 
Such an approach appears to find approval in Ehrlich, LtInteX'px>~ta­
tion des tx>aites, 24 Recuei1 des cours 5, 98-99 (1928). If con-
trolling in the instant dispute, this case would, of course, re-
solve the interpretation of the Common Understanding, in which the 
clearer text is equally rather than subordinately authoritative, in 
favor of the American side. 
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text of its force either in theory or in practice and 
prescribes no particular, and hence no arbitrary, out-
come. Moreover, the Permanent Court's vague, one-sen-
tence remark in its Polish Nationals in Danzig opinion 
may approve such a flexible approach as plausibly as a 
more restrictive doctrine. 
At least one Soviet publicist has embraced such 
general formulations of the Rule of Restrictive Inter-
pre!ation as resoluti?n of ambiguities in favor of the 
obl1gor and construct1on contra proferentem. H7 In the 
context of multilingual treaties, however, the princi-
ple prescribing supremacy of the text in the language 
of the obligor, the rule directing choice of the most 
limited obligation consistent w'ith the text, and the 
principle that a party is bound only by the text in its 
own language are explicitly rejected. 88 By such ap-
proaches doctrines that are ordinarily appropriate are 
mechanically extended ~o the difficult problems of 
multilingual treaties. 9 The proper approach is to re-
solve textual discrepancies "in light of the common 
goal the agreement was designed to acnieve,,,9Q a doc-
trine admirable, at the very least, for avoiding a 
categorical and arbitrary choice of a single text as 
conclusively revealing the intent of the parties. 
C. Summary of the Canonical Approach 
From the analysis to this point, it appears that 
the American side, in urging the more expansive inter-
pretation of the obligation over the Soviet side's more 
limited reading, would have the better case. If, in an 
actual dispute, the United States could show that its 
87. Shursha1ov, supra note 38, at 399-401. Pereterskii, 
however, is critical of similar principles. Pereterskii, supra 
note 39, at 159-65. 
88. Pereterskii, supra note 39, at 137; Shursha1ov, supra 
note 38, at 434-35. 
89. Shurshalov, supra note 38, at 435. 
90. Id. at 434. The entire Soviet discussion is for the 
most part theoretical, however, since "in practice, questions con-
nected with discrepancies between the texts of multilingual trea-
ties concluded lnth the Soviet Union have not arisen." Pereterskii, 
supra note 39, at 134. 
HeinOnline -- 6 Yale Stud. World Pub. Ord.  457 1979-1980
1980] MULTILINGUAL TREATIES 457 
interpretation of the Russian text were the more nat-
ural, it would very likely win the case at the outset. 
If, how'ever ~ it failed to do this, the analysis would 
have to fall back on a muddle of overlapping arguments 
with inconsistent results and numerous theoretical de~ 
fects. Among these arguments, the United States seems 
to have the better positions, although this is far from 
certain. In particular, the United States' arguments 
would be based on principles which are more closely 
allied to the hierarchically preferred Rule of Ordinary 
Meaning, which may mean that they would be the more con-
vincing in an actual case. The best authority in the 
jurisprudence of the International Court, the Mavrommatis 
case, has an outcome favorable to the American side, but 
strong and famous language favorable to the Soviet 
position. 
This analysis has also served to point out the 
theoretical, logical, and practical defects in the appli-
cation of rigid principles of interpretation to the 
specific problem of the Common Understanding. Signifi-
cantly, the one approach which appears to be least sub-ject to these defects--the benign form of interpretation 
by favoring the clearest text--is also the most flexible. 
III. Evidence Extrinsic to the Text 
Most students of treaty interpretation agree that 
its goal is to determine the intention of the parties 
concluding an agreement,91 Quite clearly, the extent to 
which this goal can be achieved in practice is frequent-
ly limited and may vary from case to case. 92 How pro-
perly to determine intent has been a subject for dispute. 
Various approaches have been proposed, and it is valu-
able to examine the consequences of these trends in in-
terpreting the Common Understanding. 
91. See~ e.g.~ 2 C. Ryde, International Law Chiefly as In-
terpreted and Applied by the United States l468~7l (2d rev. ed. 
1945); McDougal, et al., supra note 36, at 82-83; McNair, supra 
note 41, at 373; 1 G. Schwarzenberger, International Law 193 (2d 
ed. 1949); Fitzmaurice II, supra note 43, at 204 (''IN]o one serious-
ly denies that the aim of treaty interpretation is to give effect 
to the intentions of the parties,"); Lauterpacht, supra note 54, at 
83. But see Beckett, 43 Annuaire de ltInstitut de Droit Interna-
tional 438-39 (1950) C'IT]he task of the court is to interpret the 
treaty and not to ascertain the intention of the parties.") 
92. See generaZly Stone, Fictional, El,ements in Treaty In-
terpretation--A Study in the International, Judicial, Process~ 1 Syd-
ney L. Rev. 344 (1954). 
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A. Judicial Precedent and the Writings of Publicists 
The textual approach places primary reliance on 
the treaty document as a means for determining intent. 93 
As a consequence, there is a marked disinclination to 
consider extrinsic evidence of the intention of the 
parties, particularly tpavaU$ pp~papatoipes~ if the 
text is clear enough to interpret without such material. 
This attitude is often justified by the Ordinary Mean~ 
ing Rule. 94 The opinions of the International Court 
evince consideraBle support for the textual point of 
view,95 and the Vienna Convention is widely considered 
a victory for those supporting this approach. 96 None 
of the approaches to interpretation so far examined 
violate the principle of textuality. Adherence to this 
principle is not inconsistent with consideration of the 
text as a whole to shed light on a particular provision 
or to guarantee consistency with the remainder of the 
93. See V. Degan, L'!nterpretation des accords en droit 
international 75 (1963); Fitzmaurice II, suppa note 43, at 203~05; 
Morse, SchooZs of Apppoach to the Intepppetation of ~eaties~ 9 
Cath. U. L. Rev, 36, 39., 41 (19.60). 
94. See McDougal, et al., suppa note 36, at 226. It is 
not always clear whether the Rule of Ordinary Meaning justifies a 
textual approach or vice versa. Id. at 90 n.48. 
95. E.g.~ Second Membership opinion, [1950] I.C.J. 4, 8 
("In the present case the Court finds no difficulty in ascertain-
ing the natural and ordinary meaning of the words in question and 
no difficulty in giving effect to them •••• [T]he Court is of the 
opinion that it is not permissible, in this case, to resort to 
tpavaux ppepaPatoipes. II ); Conditions of Admission of a State to 
Membership in the United Nations, [1948] I.C.J. 57, 63 ("[T]he 
text is sufficiently clear; consequently, [the Court] does not 
feel that it should deviate from the consistent practice of the 
Permanent Court of International Justice, according to which there 
is no occasion to resort to preparatory work if the text of a con-
vention is sufficiently clear in itself.") [hereinafter cited as 
First Membership opinion]; S.S, "Lotus," [1927] P.C.I.J., serf A, 
No. 10, at 16 ("IT]here is no occasion to have regard to prepara .... 
tory work if the text of a convention is sufficiently clear in it~ 
self. II) 
96. See Brazil, suppa note 59, at 236; McDougal, The Intep-
nationaZ LauJ Commission's lJpaft ApticZes upon Intepppetation: 
TextuaZity Redivivus, 61 Am. J. Inttl L. 992 (1967); Merrills, TWo 
Apppoaches to ~eaty Intepppetation~ 1968-69 Australian Y.B. Inttl 
L. 55, 55 (1971). 
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instrument,97 although there have been instances in 
which the International Court lias examined a provision 
in isolation from the rest of the document,98 As dis-
cussed above, the outcome of such a textual analysis 
is uncertain, but the American side appears to have 
the better arguments. 
The contextual approach urges a broader conception 
of a treaty for interpretational purposes. 99 More 
specifically, this approach advocates regular accep-
tance of travaux preparatoires as evidence of the in~ 
tention of the parties. 100 As a consequence, contex-
tua1ists generally disapprove the Rule of Ordinary 
Meaning. 101 Others are opposed to hierarchies of 
97. See, e.g., Article 3, Paragraph 2, of the Treaty of 
Lausanne, [1925] P.C.I.J., ser. B, No. 12, at 21; Competence of 
the I.L.O. (Agriculture), [1922] P.C.I.J., ser. B, No.2, at 23 
("[I]t is obvious that the TI<eaty must be read as a w~ole, and 
that its meaning is not to be determined merely upon particular 
phrases which, if detached from the context, may be interpreted 
in more than one sense.") 
98. E.g. 3 Interpretation of the Convention of 1919 Concern-
ing Employment of Women During the Night, [1932] P.C.I.J., ser. 
A/B, No. 50, at 387 (Anzi1otti, J., dissenting)(arguing that an 
examination of the entire text would have produced the opposite 
result from that reached by the Court); S.S. "Wimbledon," [1923] 
P.C.I.J., ser. A, No.1, at 23-24 ("The provisions relating to 
the Kiel Canal in the Treaty of Versailles are • • • self-con-
tained; if they had to be supplemented and interpreted by the aid 
of [other parts of the treaty] they would lose their 'raison 
d t ~kre I • • • • ") 
99. See3 e.g. 3 McDougal, et al., supra note 36, at 21, 50. 
It is worthwhile to note that the International Court, especially 
in its earlier decisions, has often used the word "context" in a 
sense restricted to the entire text of a treaty. Id. at 221 & 
n.34l. See aZso Morse, supra note 93, at 39-40. Cf. Article 
31(2) of the Vienna Convention, reprinted at note 126 ~?zfra 
(context defined and limited to primary and ancillary instruments). 
100. See3 e.g. 3 McDougal, et al., supra note 36, at 128 
n.22; Harvard Research3 supra note 44, at 965-66. Soviet writers 
approve in theory of the use of preparatory materials; in practice, 
however, they are suspicious of their use by capitalist states to 
change the meaning of a treaty. Triska & Slusser, supra note 36, 
at 114, 117. The American unilateral approach is largely contex-
tual and in principle would not preclude consideration 0f any eyi-
den~e in the discussion accompanying notes 111-16 infra. Restate-
~ent (Second) 0f the Foreign Relations Law of the United States 
§§" 146, 147 & 15.1 (19..65). 
101. See3 e.g' 3 2 Kyde, supra note 91~ at 1470, 
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canons
l02 
or to the notion of the usefulness of canons 
at all.I03 Contextualists criticize textualists for 
not considering all available evidence of the inten-
tion of the parties. IQ4 Contextualists are, in turn, 
criticized for clouding the process of interpretation 
with a mass of material which may not be helpful in 
resolving the dispute. lOS Contextualists have often 
been displeased with the jurisprudence of the Interna-
tional Courtl06 and were disappointed in the Vienna 
Convention by the rejection of their approach.1 07 Prac-
tice of the International Court, however, ~uggests that 
whatever their formal or informal importance may be in 
the decision~making process, travaux preparatoires have 
rarely been excluded from consideration by the Courtl08 
and have been resorted to in decisions on several occa-
sions even by the P.C.I.J.,109 which displayed, on the 
102. See3 e.g' 3 McDougal, et al., supra note 36, at 96-97. 
103. See3 e.g' 3 Harvard Researah3 supra note 44, at 946-47. 
But see Lauterpacht. supra note 54, at 56 r~ost of the current 
rules of interpretation, whether in relation to contracts or trea-
ties, are unobjectiona'Ole.,") 
104. See3 e.g' 3 McDougal, et al., supra note 36, at xvii. 
105. See3 e.g' 3 Lord Asquith's opinion as arbitrator in 
Petroleum Development, Ltd. v. Sheikh of Abu Dhabi, 18 I.L,R. 144, 
149 (1951), 1 Int'l & Compo L.Q. 247, 251 (1952)C'Chaos may onvi-
ously result ••• if, instead of asking what the words used mean, 
the inquiry extends at large to what each of the parties meant 
them to mean, and how and why each phrase came to be inserted. tt) 
See also 1 G. Schtvarzenberger, International Law 514 (3d ed., 1957) 
(" [T]he preparatory work Ctravaux preparatoires) is of limited 
value" and "largely equivocal. "); Fitzmaurice II, supra note 43, 
at 207 ("IT]he text is the expression of the will and intention of 
the parties •••• If the text is not clear, recourse must be had 
to extraneous sources of interpretation: 'Out the object is still 
the same--to find out what the text means or must be taken to 
mean. "); McNair, 43 Annuaire de l'Institut de Droit International 
450 (1950). 
106. See3 e.g' 3 McDougal, et al., supra note 36, at 361-69. 
107, See note 96 supra. 
108. Ehrlich, supra note 41, at 244; Fitzmaurice I, supra 
43, at 13 n.l. An exception to this practice is the case of Terri-
torial Jurisdiction of the International Commission of the River 
Oder, [1929.] P.C.I.J., sere A, No. 23, in which the Permanent 
Court refused preparatory material offered on behaif of parties to 
the action which had not participated in the negotiations. McDou-
gal, et al., supra note 36, at 131 n.33; 1 Schwarzenberger, supra 
note 91, at 218. 
109. E.g' 3 Lighthouses Case Between France and Greece, 
[1934] P. C. 1. J., ser. AlB, No. 62, at 13 ("tfuere the context does 
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whole, a less receptive attitude on this point than has 
its successor.110 
Official preparatory work for the SALT II Treaty 
remains classified; it would presumably be made avail~ 
able to a tribunal in an actual case. Without access 
to the actual documents, it is difficult to say what 
their impact would be, but there is reason to believe 
that by and large they favor the American position in 
this hypothetical dispute. The evidence available on 
how' American officials interpreted the Common Under-
standing indicates their position to be that the SS-16 
is outlawed altogether. III The American side took the 
Soviets to have the same intent. llZ Unfortunately, suf-
ficiently detailed material does not seem generally 
available to ascertain the Soviet interpretation of the 
Common Understanding; Soviet writing on the subject dis-
plays a marked tendency to favor the general over the 
specific. 113 The force of arguments based on extrinsic 
109. (Continued) 
not suffice to show the precise sense in which the Parties to the 
dispute have employed these words in their Special Agreement, the 
Court, in accordance with its practice, has to consult the docu-
ments preparatory to the Special Agreement, in order to satisfy it-
self as to the true intention of the Par-ties.") See aZso cases col-
lected at 1 Schwarzenberger, supra note 91, at 218. 
110. See McDougal, et al., supra note 36, at 126-27. 
111. Secretary of State Vance, for example, was of the 
opinion that the Connnon Understanding means that "the SS-16 lias 
been banned entirely. It For. BeZ. Comm. Hear1,:ngs~ pt.l~ supra note 
6, at 92 (statement of Cyrus R, Vance). An intriguing remark from 
the point of view of the present analysis is that, in the opinion 
of one of the negotiators, "[u]nder SALT II, the production, test-
ing, and deployment of the 8S-l6 ICBM will be banned." A!'I1led Ser-
vices Comm. Hearings~ pt, 23 supra note 6, at 447 (statement of Gen. 
George M. Seignious II) (emphasis supplied). 
112. One of the negotiators of the Treaty referred to "the 
Soviet willingness to ban production of a brandnew [sic] missile, 
the development of which they had just completed--the SS-16--be-
cause we were concerned about its compatibility with the 8S-20 
launcher. II For. BeZ. Comm. Hearings~ Pt. 1~ supra note 6, at 249 
(statement of Ralph Earle II). 
113. See~ e.g.~ Matveev, OBV-2 v svete prakticheskogo opyta~ 
Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn', Sept., 1979, at 56, transZated in Interna-
tional Affairs, Oct., 1979, at 50; Pavlov & Karenin, 0 dogovore 
OBV-2 .. Me'zhdunarodnaia zhizn t, Oct., 1979, at 25, transZated in In-
ternational Affairs, Nov., 1979, at 25. 
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evidence, however, might be undermined in a diplomatic 
context if Soviet officials, like Soviet writers, sus-
pect that interpretation in light of subsequent beha-
vior and expectations of the parties invites "a factual 
violation of the principle pacta sunt servanda.l.\'1l4 
In negotiating the Treaty, each side submitted 
draft provisions in its own language. Discussion and 
compromise then produced the final text. lIS It would 
probably be improper, then, to view either text of the 
Treaty as a simple translation of the other. It is 
quite likely, however, that the Common Understanding to 
Paragraph 8 of Article TV, because of its content, was 
first proposed by the Americans. In that case~ its 
original version would have been in English, and the 
Russian text of this particular provision may very well 
be a simple translation of the English draft. Substan-
tial authority asserts that the original may carry 
greater weight despite the fact that both are authentic. 116 
Soviet writers, however, insist upon the absolute 
equality of authentic texts as expressions of the inten-
tions of the parties. 117 Pereterskii goes further in 
114. Shurshalov, supra note 38, at 445. Pereterskii, how-
ever, approves "06bl'IHbIHtI or "ysYaJIDHblli" interpretation. Pereterskii, 
supra note 39, at 119-21. This principle is well accepted outside 
the U.S.S.R., where it is often known as "practical construction." 
See~ e~g~" McNair, supra note 41, at 424 ("[W]e are on solid ground 
and are dealing with a judicial practice worthy to be called a rule, 
namely that, when there is a doubt as to the meaning of a provision 
or an expression contained in a treaty, the relevant conduct ••• 
has a high probative value as to the intention of the parties at 
the time of its conclusion. This is both good sense and good law.") 
115. See Talbott, supra note 5, at 93-94. 
116. See~ e.g.~ Interpretation of the Convention of 1919 
Concerning Employment of Women During the Night, [1932] P.C.I.J., 
sere A/B, No. 50, at 378-79; Exchange of Greek and Turkish Popula-
tions, [1925] P.C.I.J., sere B~ No. 10, at 18 ("The Convention was 
drawn up in French and therefore regard must be had to the meaning 
of the disputed term in that language."); Mavrommatis Palestine Con-
cessions, [1924] P.C.I.J., sere A, No.2, at 19 (That the meaning of 
the English text must prevail lIis indicated with especial force because. 
• • ~ the original draft of this instrument was probably made in 
English.") See aZso Hardy, supra note 62, at 99. 
117. Pereterskii, supra note 39, at 134; Shurshalov, suppa 
note 38, at 435-36. 
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asserting the principle that it is impermissible to view 
anyone authentic text as a translation of anotherll8 
and that in interpreting a treaty all authentic texts 
must be consulted.119 Soviet jurists have expressed 
this latter principle in their I.C.S. opinions. In the 
First Memoership opinion,120 for example, Judge Krylov's 
dissenting opinion stressed the importance of examining 
all five authentic texts of the United Nations Charter.121 
Likewise, in the r.C.3's advisory opinion on Certain Ex~ 
pense~ of the United Nations,122 Judge Koretsky, also in 
dissent, examined all the texts of the Charter save the 
Chinese.1 23 This is a departure from the International 
Court's usual practice of examining only the English and 
French texts of the Charter.124 These principles would 
be of obvious use to the Soviet government in responding 
to a United States attempt to make the Russian text of 
the Common Understanding appear less authoritative if it 
should turn out to have been originally drafted in Eng~ 
lish. 
B. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,125 
as one of the most recent expressions of international 
opinion on the question of treaty interpretation, has 
obvious significance for the construction of the Common 
118. Pereterskii, supra note 39, at 135. 
119. Id. at 136. Shursha10v admits an exception in approv-
ing a choice of one text as a "base" for interpretation. Shursha1ov, 
supra note 38, at 436. 
120. [1948] I.C.J. 57. 
121. Id. at 110, 112 (Kry1ov, J., dissenting). 
122. [1962] I.C.J. 151. 
123. Id. at 274 (Koretsky, J., dissenting). 
124. Germer, Interpretation of PZuriUngua7, Tx>eaties: A 
Study of Article 33 of the Vienna Convention on the LaN of Tx>eaties~ 
11 Harv. Int'l L.J. 400, 413 (1970). Germer criticizes the 
doctrine requiring examination of all the texts as a routine matter, 
even in the aosence of an alleged discrepancy, as allowing "needless 
complications of the interpretation process." Id. at 412. 
125. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/27 (1969). Neither the United 
States nor the Soviet Union is a party to the Convention, although 
the United States is a signatory. The Convention came into force on 
January 27, 1980. Multilateral Treaties in Respect of Which the 
Secretary-General Performs Depository Functions, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/ 
SER.D/13, at 597-98 (1980). 
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Understanding. The provisions dealing with treaty in-
terpretation are generally thought to represent a modi-
fied textual approach;lZ6 travaux preparatoires are al-
lowed, but only as a supplementary means of interpreta-
tion.lZ7 Of the three articles dealing with interpreta-
126. See generaUy Jacoos, Varieti"es of Approach to Treaty 
Interpretation: With. Special, Reference to the Draft Convention on 
the LalJJ of Treaties BefoZ'e the Vienna Dipl,omatic Conference .. 18 
Int'l & Comp L.Q. 318 (1969). The principle of textuality is ex-
pressed in Article 31, the first of three provisions dealing witn 
interpretation: 
Article 31 
~eneral rule of interpretation 
1. A treaty snaIl De interpreted in good faith in 
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the 
terms of the treaty in their conte~t and in the light 
of its object and purpose. 
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation 
of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, 
including its preamole and annexes: 
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which 
was made between all the parties in connexion 
with the conclusion of the treaty; 
(b) any instrument which was made oy one or more 
parties in connexion with the conclusion of the 
treaty and accepted by the other parties as 
an instrument related to the treaty. 
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the 
context; 
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties 
regarding the interpretation of the treaty or 
the application of its provisions; 
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of 
the treaty which establishes the agreement of 
the parties regarding its interpretation; 
(c) any relevant rules of international law 
applicable in the relations between the parties. 
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is 
established that the parties so intended. 
127. Article 32 estaolishes the secondary importance of prepara-
tory material: 
Article 32 
Supplementary means of interpretation 
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of inter-
pretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and 
the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm 
the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or 
to determine the meaning when the interpretation according 
HeinOnline -- 6 Yale Stud. World Pub. Ord.  465 1979-1980
1980] MULTILINGUAL TREATIES 
tion 1 one is devoted exclusively to the problems pre-
sented by multiple authentic texts: 
Article 33 
Interpretation of treaties authenticated in two 
or more languages 
1. When a treaty has been authenticated 
in two or more languages, the text is equally 
authoritative in each language, unless the 
treaty provides or the parties agree that, in 
case of divergence, a particular text shall 
prevail. 
2. A version of the treaty in a language 
other than one of those in which the text was 
authenticated shall be considered an authen-
tic text only if the treaty so provides or 
the parties so agree. 
3. The terms of the treaty are presumed 
to have the same meaning in each authentic 
text. 
4. Except where a particular text pre-
vails in accordance with paragraph 1, when 
a comparison of the authentic texts discloses 
a difference of meaning which the application 
of articles 31 and 32 does not remove, the 
meaning which best reconciles the texts, hav-
ing regard to the object and purpose of the 
treaty, shall be adopted. 
465 
Article 33(3), establishing a presumption in favor of 
identical meanings for equally authentic texts in differ-
ent languages, is intended to provide that "every effort 
should be made to find a common meaning for the texts be-
fore preferring one to another."128 A statement of pre-
f~rence for the clearest text was explicitly rejected. 129 
An interpreter relying on the Vienna Convention, whether 
a national official or an international tribunal, would 
127. (Continued) 
to article 31: 
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or 
(b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd 
or unreasonable. 
128. Germer, sup~ note 124, at 402. 
129. rd. at 406. 
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have to reject much of the traditional textual analysis 
proposed above as inconsistent with this presumption. 
As important as Article 33(3) is, the main provi-
sion for interpreting multilingual treaties is Article 
33(4), which is noteworthy for its lack of specificity,13Q 
It appears to contain no canonical or hierarchical ele-
ments, save its incorporation oy reference of Articles 
31 and 32,131 which are intended in a general way to 
"isolate and codify the relatively few . . . general 
rules for the interpretation of treaties."132 The Uni-
ted States, consistent with its general contextual 
stand, introduced an amendment which resulted in the in-
corporation into Article 33(4) of the phrase tlhaving 
regard to the object and purpose of the treaty," which 
is intended to encourage a more flexible solution.133 
Despite the realization, evidenced by the very 
existence of Article 33, that multilingual treaties re-
quire special treatment,134 the Vienna Convention fails 
to provide much guidance to the treaty interpreter. 135 
130, Id. at 403. 
131. See notes 126 & 127 sup~a. 
132. Brazil, sup~a note 59, at 235. But see Germer, sup~a 
note 124, at 415 (the Convention does not specify the appropriate-
ness of applying any given principle to a particular case). See 
generaZZy Lachs, The Law of Treaties: Some GeneraZ RefZections on 
the Report of the InternationaZ Law Commission, in Recueil d'~tudes 
de droit international en hommage a Paul Guggenheim 391 (1968) (sug-
gesting that a better concept of the ~vork of the framers of the Con ... 
vention may be a thoughtful reevaluation of existing rules). 
133. Germer, supra note 124, at 424-25. This language is 
intended to indicate a rejection of the Mavrommatis form of the Rule 
of Restrictive Interpretation. Id. at 423-24. See aZso Brazil, 
supra note 59, at 238. Interpretation by reliance on goals and 
purposes is sometimes termed a Hteleological" approach, See:# e.g.~ 
Jacobs, supra note 126, at 323-25. Some see this approach as a 
statement of the Principle of Effectiveness. See~ e.g.~ McDougal, 
et al., supra note 36, at 156-58. 
134. The Institute of International Law's 1956 resolution on 
the interpretation of treaties, for example, contains no special 
provision for multilingual treaties. See 46 Annuaire de l'Institut 
de Droit International 358 (1956). See aZso McDougal, et al., supra 
note 36, at 91 n.5l. 
135. Some may see this as a virtue. See~ e.g.~ Germer, 
supra note 124, at 403 (UPrevious consideration of specific rules 
for the interpretation of plurilingual treaties had demonstrated 
many of the difficulties inherent in an attempt to create a univer-
sal rule.") 
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Considering the discussion above 1 the Convention's pre-
ference for the textual approach even in dealing with 
the difficult problems of the plurilingual agreement is 
hardly admirable. The drafters were obviously aware 
that even if one concedes the appropriateness of a tex~ 
tual approach, such general principles as are expressed 
in Article 31 are often inadequate to deal with the 
particular problem of multilingual treaties. Moreover, 
Article 33(3), though meritorious in suggesting that all 
tile texts are to be given effect if possible, disfavors 
many of the more refined textual approaches specifically 
adapted to multilingual treaties. In short, few if any 
textual approaches will suffice as a general principle 
for the interpretation of plurilingua1s consistent with 
the directive of Article 33(3) that all the texts are to 
De given effect. Nonetheless, by referring to Article 
31, the first part of Article 33(4J confusingly reas-
serts the importance of the textual approach. 
Only if Article 31 fails to provide a resolution, 
as it presumably will in a large number of cases, may 
the interpreter consult the preparatory work as a sup-
plementary means of construction. The threshold stan-
dard prescribed by Article 32 is that the meaning remain 
"ambiguous or obscure" or the result be "manifestly 
absurd or unreasonable" after the application of Article 
31. Almost by assumption, any discrepancy between equal-
ly authentic texts significant enough to become a genuine 
dispute will meet this test. Certainly, many more cases 
will be resolved after consulting tpavaux ppepapatoipes 
than from application of Article 31 alone. If a resolu-
tion still eludes the interpreter,136 the remainder of 
Article 33(4)--"the meaning which best reconciles the 
texts, having regard to the object and purpose of the 
treaty1. shall be adopted"--fai1s to provide much guid-
ance.l~7 Perhaps this is the best approach; if resort to 
the preparatory work has failed to provide a clear answer, 
any further rules are likely to be more arbitrary than 
beneficial. 
The Vienna Convention does not address other ques-
tions of importance to multilingual treaty interpretation. 
136. The United States asserted that this would often be the 
case, hence the need for the amendment. rd. at 425. 
137. It is clear that at this point the presumption of Arti-
cle 33(3} is no longer operative. This last part of Article 33(4) 
is intended to encourage a flexible resolution without regard to 
rules. rd. at 423-27. 
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For instance, it is not clear how or when the presump-
tion of Article 33(3), that both texts are to be given 
effect, may be rebutted.138 In difficult cases, giv-
ing effect to all the texts may be an impossible task. 
In particular, it is important to know whether the pre-
sumption may be rebutted after the application of Arti-
cle 31 and before the application of Article 32,139 in 
which case the preparatory work might not be considered. 
In a genuinely difficult case, a conscientious interpre-
ter would certainly turn to the travaux preparatoires3 
as the International Court has in the past,14Q but the 
Convention, in failing to describe the relationship be-
tween the presumption of Article 33(3) and the threshold 
of Article 32, leaves an analytical gap. As suggested 
above, there is an analogous gap and a potential con-
flict between the principle of textuality and the pre-
sumption of identical meaning. Perhaps the Vienna Con-
ventionts approach is most generously described as as-
serting the importance of certain interpretive devices--
travaux3 the principle of textuality, the presumption of 
identical meaning--while being deliberately vague on the 
standards for their interaction. Such an indefinite ap-
proach may well enhance the Conventionts potential to 
deal flexibly with plurilingual treaty construction. 
The Convention also fails to deal with the problem 
of translations. It does not instruct an interpreter to 
consider the fact, which would probably come to light 
during examination of the preparatory work, that one au-
thentic text is a translation of another. 14l The prac-
tice of the International Court suggests that such an 
approach would be proper,142 but the text of the Conven-
tion does not codify this principle. 
lrhatever its defects,143 the Vienna Convention's 
138. It has been suggested that this presumption is easily 
rebutted. Id. at 413-14. 
139. See notes 126 & 127 supra .. 
140. See note 109 supra. 
141. One view is that it is improper to view the original 
text as decisive, although it may acquire greater force as a result 
of an examination of the preparatory material. Germer, supra note 
124, at 418. 
142. See note 116 supra. 
143. The Conventionts defects in this area may not in fact 
be substantial; no state which has yet acceded to it has made a 
reservation dealing with the interpretation section. Multilateral 
Treaties in Respect of Which the Secretary-General Performs Deposi-
tory Functions, supra note 125, at 598-602. 
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approach involves basically the same considerations dis-
cussed previously. In short, the United States could 
well prevail at the outset with an argument based on 
the ordinary meaning of the Russian text. The presump-
tion of identical meaning, which should be decisive in 
this case, adds force to this argument. If this argu-
ment failed, further application of a textual approach 
would be largely unproductive. Refer~nce to the 
travaux preparatoires would, quite probably, sufficient-
ly strengthen the United States' position to settle the 
case in its favor. The exhortation of Article 33(4) to 
solve the problem by relying on the aims of the treaty 
would most probably not come into play, since the two 
texts are not absolutely irreconcilable. If it were 
applied, however, this method of construction could also 
favor the position of the United States, in accord with 
the parties' declaration in the Preamble to the Treaty 
of their intent "to take measures for the further limi-
tation and for the further reduction of strategi~ arms, 
having in mind the goal of achieving general and com-
plete disarmament."144 
Conclusion 
Circumstances surrounding the negotiation of the 
Common Understanding to Paragraph 8 of Article IV of the 
SALT II Treaty, outlawing the Soviet SS-16 long-range 
missile, probably remove any question about the meaning 
of the provision. 14S Even were this not so, standard 
approaches for multilingual treaty interpretation would 
very likely uphold the meaning of the English text at 
the expense of alternative interpretations of the Rus-
sian. The possibility of a textual discrepancy here is 
yet another example of disparities that can arise in 
even the most carefully drafted treaties, largely as a 
result of irreducible problems of translation.146 In 
this instance, it is also likely that the choice of word-
ing was influenced by factors other than the desire for 
maximum linguistic precision in articulating the extent 
of the undertaking. The official text of the Common Un-
144. Dep't State Bull., supra note 3, at 23; 18 Int'l Legal 
Materials 1139; 37 Congo Q. Weekly Rep. 1228. 
145. See Talbott, supra note 5, at 134-35 (suggesting that 
the statements of the Soviet negotiators indicate complete abandon-
ment of the SS-16 in the Common Understanding, which 'tvould be in 
keeping with the unequivocal meaning of the English text). 
146. See Hardy, supra note 62, at 82. 
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derstanding may reflect a compromise on how to express a 
subjective impression of the importance of the obliga-
tion rather than its extent. 
The fact that the most careful drafting may still 
produce texts which imperfectly reflect the meaning of 
other authentic texts is likely to be small comfort to 
a treaty interpreter confronted with a discrepancy, for 
the realization is of no use in selecting one of the 
proffered alternatives. Moreover, such a recognition, 
if officially acknowledged or sanctioned, would conflict 
with the basic principle that each provision of a treaty 
has only one meaning. Because of the complexity of the 
task, an interpreter faced with a discrepancy between 
equally authentic texts should be wary of any prescrip-
tive rule beyond the most general presumptions of equal 
authenticity and identical meaning. 
Prior attempts to formulate a controlling general 
principle for resolving discrepancies in plurilingual 
treaties have demonstrated the difficulty in articula-
ting a prescriptive rule which is simply general enough 
to cover all possible situations. Even worse, most pro-
posed solutions are arbitrary and lacking in theoretical 
justification. For this reason, an interpreter of a 
multilingual treaty should not feel constrained by any 
of these formulations. This is not to say that the 
policies behind any individual principle are valueless, 
but that the applicability of each approach should be 
considered in context and no one doctrine should be re-
garded as controlling. Of course, such a flexible ap-
proach to this potentially difficult problem necessarily 
involves an examination of the context of a discrepancy, 
in particular travaux praparatoires. 
There is little reason to think that the cases dis-
cussed here were resolved in other than a flexible man-
ner, with the possible exception of consideration of the 
preparatory material. As in its Mavrommatis and Compe-
tence of the I.L.O. opinions, the International Court 
has sometimes considered several grounds of decision, 
accepting some and rejecting others. But often, as in 
both these opinions, the controlling principle in the 
decision is less clearly stated than are those which the 
Court dismissed. This suggests that the true, as well as 
the best, rationale for a decision reconciling equally 
authentic texts of a multilingual treaty is an overall 
impression of the intention of the parties based on all 
available evidence. 
